



RESEARCH ARTICLE

I LOOKED AT THE ROSE AND SAID, 'BEAUTIFUL', AND IT BECAME BEAUTIFUL – A PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Samirranjan Adhikari¹, Moumita Karmakar² and Malay Halder³

¹Professor, Department of Education, Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, West Bengal, India; ²Research Scholar, Department of Education, Swami Vivekananda University, Barrackpore, West Bengal, India; ³Assistant Professor, Parameswar Mahavidyalaya (B.Ed), Namkhana, South 24 Parganas & Research Scholar, Department of Education, Swami Vivekananda University, Barrackpore, West Bengal, India

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 09th March, 2025
Received in revised form
21st April, 2025
Accepted 19th May, 2025
Published online 24th June, 2025

Key words:

Perception, Beauty, Constructivism,
Phenomenology, Cognitive Appraisal.

*Corresponding author:

Samirranjan Adhikari

ABSTRACT

The interrelation between perception and reality has long intrigued philosophers and psychologists alike. This discourse, titled "*I looked at the rose and said, 'Beautiful', and it became beautiful*", explores the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of how human cognition and language co-construct meaning and beauty. Drawing on phenomenology, constructivism, and positive psychology, this paper examines how subjective perception influences aesthetic experience. Philosophically rooted in the works of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and psychologically supported by the theories of cognitive appraisal (Lazarus, 1991) and self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948), the study argues that beauty is not a fixed property but a relational construct that emerges from cognitive interpretation and emotional engagement. The role of intentionality in perception is highlighted, underscoring the transformative power of language and awareness in defining and experiencing the world. By bridging philosophical contemplation with psychological empiricism, the paper provides a nuanced understanding of how thought, speech, and consciousness participate in shaping aesthetic reality.

Copyright©2025, Samirranjan Adhikari et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Samirranjan Adhikari, Moumita Karmakar and Malay Halder. 2025. "I Looked at the Rose and Said, 'Beautiful', and It Became Beautiful – A Philosophical and Psychological Discourse". *International Journal of Current Research*, 17, (06), 33273-33278.

1. Introduction

The simple yet profound statement, "*I looked at the rose and said, 'Beautiful', and it became beautiful*", encapsulates a rich intersection of philosophical introspection and psychological inquiry. This phrase challenges the objectivity of reality and elevates the role of perception, cognition, and language in shaping human experiences. At its core, it brings to light the fundamental question: *Does beauty exist independently, or is it created through the conscious act of perceiving and labelling?* This conundrum resonates with philosophical idealism, phenomenology, and cognitive psychology, all of which seek to explore how the mind constructs reality.

2. Philosophical Foundations

The statement epitomizes the age-old philosophical inquiry into the nature of reality, perception, and the role of the observer in constructing experience. This discourse stands at the intersection of *phenomenology*, *constructivism*, and *existential-humanistic philosophy*, which serve as the bedrock for understanding psychological phenomena on scientific grounds.

From a philosophical standpoint, the statement reflects elements of constructivism, where reality is not passively received but actively built by the knower (Piaget, 1970). The idealist school, particularly thinkers like George Berkeley, argued that existence itself is dependent on perception to be is to be perceived (Berkeley, 1710/2009). Similarly, phenomenologists such as Husserl (1913/1982) emphasized the intentionality of consciousness, the idea that all perception is directed toward something and that our experiences are filtered through subjective awareness. Thus, the "beauty" of the rose does not merely exist in the object but is born in the interplay between the object and the perceiving subject.

2.1 Phenomenology and Perceptual Intentionality

The phrase poetically encapsulates the transformative role of consciousness and perception in the construction of meaning and aesthetic experience. This experiential statement becomes the anchor point for a phenomenological and psychological exploration of perceptual intentionality, a concept central to

phenomenology and increasingly influential in cognitive psychology and the science of consciousness.

2.1.1 Phenomenology: The Primacy of Experience

Phenomenology, as established by Edmund Husserl, begins with the recognition that consciousness is always intentional; it is always “about” something. This notion of *intentionality* refers not to intention in the sense of will but to the directedness of mental acts toward objects (Husserl, 1913/1982). When the subject states, “I looked at the rose and said, ‘Beautiful,’” the perception of the rose is not a passive reception of sensory data but an intentional act through which the object (the rose) becomes constituted in consciousness as “beautiful.”

Phenomenology proposes a radical shift from objectivist realism to subjective experience, suggesting that the world appears to the subject through consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) argued, perception is not a mere photograph of reality but a lived experience mediated by the body and situated in a particular horizon of meaning. Thus, the beauty of the rose does not exist independently of perception but emerges through perception, through an intentional act of valuation.

2.1.2 Perceptual Intentionality and Constitution of Meaning

The concept of perceptual intentionality indicates that our sensory experiences are directed toward phenomena in a meaningful way. This implies a cognitive structure in which the perceiver is not a passive recipient of stimuli but an active interpreter who brings meaning to what is perceived (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). The moment the observer says “beautiful,” a value-laden meaning is attributed to the rose. The intentional act of naming transforms the perceived object, psychologically and phenomenologically, by constituting its essence as beautiful. This constitution is not a fabrication or hallucination but is grounded in embodied perception and cognitive affectivity. According to Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), cognition is enactive; perception and experience are dynamically co-constituted by the organism and its environment. Therefore, the beauty of the rose is not merely in the object but in the *relational matrix* formed by the perceiver’s cognitive, emotional, and contextual engagement with it.

2.1.3 Psychological Footings: From Subjectivity to Empirical Ground

While phenomenology emphasizes subjectivity, modern psychology has increasingly sought to ground these insights in empirical frameworks. The cognitive psychology of aesthetic perception, for instance, recognizes that evaluations of beauty involve top-down processing, where past experiences, cultural background, and emotional states influence perception (Leder et al., 2004). When the subject calls the rose “beautiful,” this verbal attribution is shaped by schemas and affective responses that are psychologically traceable. Neuroscience supports this view through studies on the default mode network and affective valuation in the medial prefrontal cortex, which show

that personal significance and beauty attribution are naturally instantiated (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014). Hence, the “becoming” of the rose’s beauty is not a mystical event but a psychologically and neurologically coherent transformation anchored in intentional perception and subjective meaning-making.

2.1.4 Interplay of Language and Reality

Another crucial dimension of the discourse is the performative power of language. The utterance “Beautiful” is not merely descriptive; constitutive language here is a cognitive tool that solidifies perceived beauty. According to Searle (1969), certain speech acts, especially those imbued with affect and intention, have illocutionary force, meaning they perform actions rather than merely describe states. The statement “Beautiful” brings forth an aesthetic valuation into lived reality, shaping the object in consciousness. This aligns with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posits that language influences thought and perception. By naming the rose as beautiful, the perceiver is not only expressing an internal state but also reshaping the perceptual field, thus anchoring beauty in the very fabric of experience (Boroditsky, 2011).

2.1.5 Philosophical-Psychological Synthesis

In synthesizing phenomenology and psychology, the said statement can be seen as emblematic of the co-creative nature of human consciousness. The rose, as a sensory object, is transformed not by the change in its materiality but by the intentional structure of perception, the emotional engagement, and the cognitive-linguistic act of naming. It highlights that reality, especially aesthetic reality, is not merely discovered but participated in an interplay of perception, emotion, cognition, and language. This discourse bridges the phenomenological insight that perception is always meaningful with the psychological understanding of how meaning is formed, confirming that beauty is not just seen, it is intended, constructed, and enacted.

2.2 Aesthetic Idealism and the Nature of Beauty

The contemplation of beauty has long straddled the realms of philosophy and psychology. The statement encapsulates the interplay between perception, valuation, and meaning-making. This poetic utterance is deeply aligned with the principles of aesthetic idealism, a philosophical doctrine that posits that beauty is not a fixed attribute of the object but is constructed, activated, or even created through the observer’s mental and emotional engagement. Psychological science complements this discourse by analyzing how perceptual, cognitive, and affective mechanisms contribute to the experience and attribution of “beauty”. Together, they provide a unified lens through which beauty emerges as both a subjective judgment and an intersubjective reality.

2.2.1 Aesthetic Idealism: Philosophical Foundations

Aesthetic idealism argues that beauty is not an inherent quality of objects but is constituted in the mind of the perceiver. Rooted in the German idealist tradition, thinkers such as

Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel emphasized that aesthetic experience is a function of human judgment and reason. Kant (1790/2000), in his *Critique of Judgment*, wrote that the perception of beauty arises from a disinterested pleasure, meaning that the observer perceives an object as beautiful without desire or utility, reflecting an a priori structure of judgment grounded in the faculties of imagination and understanding. Meanwhile, Hegel (1835/1975) extended this notion by asserting that beauty manifests when the material world reflects the ideal and when the physical form resonates with the spiritual essence or idea. Beauty thus becomes a realisation of the Absolute Spirit, apprehended through aesthetic consciousness. In this framework, the utterance “*and it became beautiful*” is not magical realism, but a reflection of dialectical transformation: the mind imposes order and value upon sensory input, elevating the rose from a mere biological entity to an idealised symbol.

2.2.2 Psychological Perspective: Beauty as Constructed Experience

From a psychological standpoint, the experience of beauty is now widely understood as a neurocognitive and emotional construction, rather than a passive reaction to inherent qualities. Research in neurasthenics (Zeki, 1999; Chatterjee, 2014) reveals that perceiving beauty activates brain regions associated with reward, emotion, and self-referential processing, particularly the orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and default mode network. This supports the thesis that beauty is deeply entwined with subjective experience.

Moreover, constructivist psychology suggests that meanings, including aesthetic judgments, are constructed through personal schemas, past experiences, and cultural conditioning (Neisser, 1976). When an individual labels a rose as “beautiful”, they are drawing upon internalised cultural-symbolic frameworks of what constitutes beauty, often shaped by early exposure, personal associations, and social narratives (Reber, Schwarz & Winkielman, 2004). In addition, social constructivist theories of aesthetics argue that beauty judgments are embedded in language and discourse (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The very act of naming, as in “*and I said, ‘Beautiful,’*” is performative, shaping perception through linguistic framing. This resonates with Vygotsky’s (1978) view that higher-order functions, including evaluative judgment, are mediated through social language.

2.2.3 Symbolic Interactionism and Aesthetic Attribution

The statement also exemplifies the principle of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969), where meaning arises through interaction. Beauty, in this sense, is not a static property but is negotiated and affirmed through the interaction between observer and object. When the subject affirms the rose’s beauty, they engage in a dialogical act of mutual recognition between the self and the aesthetic stimulus. This attribution transforms perception, making beauty not merely seen but realised. This aligns with phenomenological psychology, particularly as explored by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), who emphasised that perception is not a detached observation but an embodied, intentional act. Beauty emerges in the

relation between subject and object, shaped by affective presence and existential context.

2.2.4 Aesthetic Idealism and the Transformative Gaze

The act of labelling the rose “beautiful” invokes the transformative power of the gaze. This suggests not only that beauty is in the eye of the beholder but also that beauty can be called into being through an attuned, appreciative consciousness. This phenomenon is described in positive psychology as the “broaden-and-build” effect (Fredrickson, 2001), where positive affect expands cognitive and perceptual openness, allowing one to perceive more beauty in the environment. Furthermore, mindfulness studies support the claim that beauty becomes more perceptible when attention is focused and present. Brown and Ryan (2003) found that mindful awareness enhances aesthetic appreciation, as individuals notice subtle patterns, textures, and harmonies that might otherwise go unrecognized. The phrase “*I looked at the rose and said, ‘Beautiful,’ and it became beautiful*” is more than poetic musing; it encapsulates the essence of aesthetic idealism and is validated by modern psychological findings. Philosophically, it reflects the idealist notion that the mind constitutes aesthetic reality; psychologically, it affirms that beauty is a dynamic construct arising from perception, cognition, emotion, and social language. This integrated discourse highlights the co-creative role of the perceiver in aesthetic experience. Beauty, thus, is neither wholly in the object nor entirely in the subject, but in the relational act of recognition, whereby a rose, upon being seen through the lens of idealistic consciousness, truly becomes beautiful.

2.3 The Speech Act and Performativity

The declaration exemplifies the intricate interplay between language, perception, and psychological effect, rooted in the theoretical traditions of speech act theory and performativity. This assertion is not merely poetic but points towards a deeper ontological claim that reality can be shaped, or at least reframed, through linguistic utterance. To ground this philosophically and psychologically, we must turn to J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, Judith Butler’s extension of performativity, and psychological theories of cognitive appraisal and meaning-making.

2.3.1 Speech Acts: From Description to Doing

In his foundational work, *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin (1962) distinguishes between constative utterances (which describe the world) and performative utterances (which *do* something in the act of being said). When someone says, “*I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth*”, or “*I apologize*”, they are not describing but enacting. Similarly, when the speaker says “*Beautiful*” while looking at the rose, the utterance can be understood as performative; it is not a report of beauty but a creative act of ascribing beauty. The speech act, in this context, does not merely reflect internal aesthetic judgment but *constitutes* the aesthetic value in the subjective experience.

2.3.2 Performativity: The Power of Language in Constituting Reality

Building upon Austin, Judith Butler (1997) expanded the notion of performativity to include the iterative power of discourse to produce that which it names. For Butler, identity, gender, and even psychological categories are not pre-existing entities expressed through language but are constituted through repeated performative acts. Transposed into the context of psychological perception, the utterance “*Beautiful*” becomes a formative performance that instantiates beauty in both the object and the subject’s perception. In other words, language has ontological force; it does not merely describe the world but shapes the experience of the world.

2.3.3 Phenomenological and Cognitive Perspectives

From a phenomenological standpoint, as articulated by Merleau-Ponty (1962), perception is not a passive reception but an active engagement with the world. When one says “*Beautiful*”, the gaze upon the rose is already imbued with meaning; beauty is not a property of the rose independent of perception but arises within the intentional act of consciousness. This correlates with constructivist theories in psychology, particularly those related to cognitive appraisal theory, where emotional meaning is assigned based on how one evaluates a stimulus (Lazarus, 1991). Thus, labelling the rose as “beautiful” feeds back into the emotional and cognitive circuitry, amplifying the perception of beauty through linguistic framing.

2.3.4 Self-Perception, Suggestion, and Affect

Psychologically, the utterance can also be tied to theories of self-perception (Bem, 1972) and verbal suggestion. When one articulates “beautiful,” especially in a self-reflexive act, it can influence one’s own emotional state and cognitive biases. Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) note that priming and automaticity play significant roles in shaping perception and affect. Language can prime emotional responses, subtly altering the psychological appraisal of stimuli. Therefore, saying “*Beautiful*” may not only reflect beauty but generate it via cognitive-affective processes.

2.3.5 Dialogic Interaction and Interpersonal Reality

Additionally, Bakhtinian dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981) sheds light on the relational aspect of language. Language does not exist in a vacuum; it is dialogic, shaped by past utterances, and oriented toward future responses. In this frame, the declaration “*Beautiful*” is not only a speech act aimed at the rose but also an invitation to others, even to oneself, in a reflective sense, to see the rose as beautiful. This has implications for social constructionist psychology, which posits that reality is co-constructed through shared discourses (Gergen, 1994).

2.3.6 Philosophical-Psychological Confluence

Hence, the phrase “*I looked at the rose and said, 'Beautiful', and it became beautiful*” is not a mere metaphor but a psycho-linguistic event grounded in both philosophical performativity and psychological constructivism. It suggests that language shapes perception, that naming is a form of knowing, and that emotion and cognition are entangled with linguistic expression.

This discourse aligns with post-structural views that reject the objectivity of categories like “beauty” and instead understand them as emergent from interactions between the subject, the object, and the linguistic medium.

3. Psychological Perspectives

The statement “*I looked at the rose and said, 'Beautiful', and it became beautiful*” captures the essence of how human cognition and perception can shape reality, a phenomenon deeply embedded in psychological inquiry. This statement suggests that the observer’s subjective interpretation imbues the object with a certain quality, in this case, “beauty”. From a psychological standpoint, this can be understood through several theoretical lenses, including constructivism, phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and positive psychology.

3.1 Constructivist Perspective

Constructivism in psychology posits that individuals actively construct their reality based on experiences, perceptions, and mental schemas (Piaget, 1952; Vygotsky, 1978). When the observer labels the rose as “beautiful,” this act of naming is not a mere description but a construction of a new psychological reality. The meaning of “beauty” is conferred upon the rose through the observer’s interpretive framework. Thus, beauty is not an intrinsic property of the rose but a construct of the mind, shaped by prior knowledge, affective states, and cultural meanings. As Bruner (1990) noted, “Reality does not exist independently of the mind; it is constructed through symbolic processes.”

3.2 Phenomenological Perspective

Phenomenology, especially as articulated by Edmund Husserl and later explored in psychology by thinkers such as Carl Rogers, emphasizes subjective experience as the core of human understanding. The perception of beauty arises not from the object itself but from the intentional act of consciousness directed toward the object (Husserl, 1931). From this perspective, the rose becomes beautiful *in the moment of the observer’s conscious recognition of its beauty* – a lived, subjective experience rather than an objective truth. Carl Rogers (1961) similarly emphasized the importance of personal meaning and congruence, stating that perception shapes reality and that an individual’s experience is the basis of psychological truth.

3.3 Cognitive Psychological Perspective

Cognitive psychology explores the internal processes that influence how we perceive and interpret stimuli. The evaluation of the rose as “beautiful” is a result of cognitive appraisal, involving attention, categorization, and emotional valuation (Lazarus, 1991). This appraisal is influenced by memory, expectation, and personal significance, showing that cognition does not merely record reality but actively *filters and frames* it. Cognitive schema theory (Bartlett, 1932; Rumelhart, 1980) also explains how individuals apply learned frameworks to interpret new information. If the observer holds a schema in which roses symbolize love or peace, the cognitive application of “beauty” becomes almost automatic.

3.4 Positive Psychological Perspective

The statement can also be examined through the lens of positive psychology, particularly about the role of positive perception in enhancing subjective well-being and reality construction. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) emphasized that focusing on beauty, gratitude, and appreciation can elevate mental states and lead to *flourishing*. By labelling the rose as beautiful, the observer not only alters the perception of the object but also influences their emotional state, reinforcing positive affect and psychological resilience. Moreover, Fredrickson's (2001) broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions posits that positive emotions broaden cognitive and behavioural repertoires and help build enduring personal resources. Thus, recognizing beauty in the mundane can have long-term psychological benefits.

3.5 Social Constructivism and Language

From a social constructivist viewpoint, the statement also underscores the performative power of language in shaping both perception and shared meaning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Language does not merely describe reality; it creates it. The utterance "beautiful" transforms the rose through an intersubjective process, aligning with Vygotsky's (1978) idea that higher psychological functions develop through social and linguistic mediation. Furthermore, studies in narrative psychology suggest that the way people narrate their experiences using emotionally laden or value-driven language can alter both memory and emotional responses to those experiences (Bruner, 2002).

4. Conclusion

The discourse, "I looked at the rose and said, 'Beautiful', and it became beautiful", reveals the profound interplay between perception, cognition, and emotional meaning-making, emphasising that beauty is not solely an inherent attribute of an object but also a construct of human consciousness. From a philosophical standpoint, this aligns with phenomenological traditions, which assert that subjective experience gives reality its form (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012). Psychologically, the perception of beauty is shaped by cognitive appraisals and emotional states, suggesting that the observer's inner world transforms the object perceived (Leder et al., 2004). This reflection supports the theory of constructivist psychology, which posits that individuals actively construct meaning from sensory inputs (Kelly, 1955). In the act of labelling the rose as "beautiful", the observer not only ascribes aesthetic value but alters the experience of the rose itself through affective and cognitive filtering mechanisms (Gross, 2002). Empirical studies in neuroaesthetics further validate this dynamic, showing that areas in the brain responsible for reward and emotion, such as the orbitofrontal cortex, are activated when individuals engage with self-appraised beauty (Ishizu & Zeki, 2011). Moreover, the statement reflects a kind of self-fulfilling aesthetic prophecy, where affirming positive qualities leads to greater experiential richness and well-being (Fredrickson, 2001). This underscores the reciprocal relationship between language, thought, and perception, a triad central to both Vygotskian and post-structural psychological theories (Vygotsky, 1986; Gergen, 2009). In conclusion, this philosophical and psychological reflection invites us to consider the transformative power of human perception, not merely as a passive reception of external stimuli but as an

active force capable of shaping reality. The utterance "Beautiful" does not merely describe the rose; it animates it through the lens of subjective reverence and psychological significance. Such insights reinforce the scientific grounding of aesthetics within human cognition and affirm the enduring truth that beauty, as much as it is seen, is also said into being.

REFERENCES

- Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. *Oxford University Press*.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: Four essays. *University of Texas Press*.
- Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. *International Universities Press*.
- Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 6, 1 – 62.
- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. *Anchor Books*.
- Berkeley, G. (2002). A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. *Project Gutenberg*.
- Berkeley, G. (2009). A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. *Project Gutenberg*.
- Berlyne, D. E. (1971). Aesthetics and psychobiology. *Appleton-Century-Crofts*.
- Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. *University of California Press*.
- Boroditsky, L. (2011). How language shapes thought. *Scientific American*, 304(2), 62–65. <https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0211-62>
- Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84(4), 822–848. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.822>
- Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. *Harvard University Press*.
- Bruner, J. (2002). Making stories: Law, literature, life. *Harvard University Press*.
- Butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. *Routledge*.
- Cela-Conde, C. J., Agnati, L., Huston, J. P., Mora, F., & Nadal, M. (2011). The neural foundations of aesthetic appreciation. *Progress in Neurobiology*, 94(1), 39–48. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2011.03.003>
- Chatterjee, A. (2014). The Aesthetic Brain: How We Evolved to Desire Beauty and Enjoy Art. *Oxford University Press*.
- Chatterjee, A., & Vartanian, O. (2014). Neuroaesthetics: *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 18(7), 370–375. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.03.003>
- Chittka, L., & Menzel, R. (1992). The evolutionary adaptation of flower colours and the insect pollinators' colour vision. *Journal of Comparative Physiology A*, 171(2), 171–181. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00188925>
- Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception-behaviour expressway: Automatic effects of social perception on social behaviour. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 1–40. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(01\)80003-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(01)80003-4)
- Dilthey, W. (1976). Selected writings. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. *Norton*.

- Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. *American Psychologist*, 56(3), 218–226. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.3.218>
- Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The phenomenological mind. *Routledge*.
- Gergen, K. J. (1994). Realities and relationships: Soundings in social construction. *Harvard University Press*.
- Gergen, K. J. (2009). An invitation to social construction. *SAGE Publications*.
- Goldstein, E. B. (2019). Cognitive psychology: Connecting mind, research, and everyday experience. *Cengage Learning*.
- Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. *Psychophysiology*, 39(3), 281–291. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0048577201393198>
- Han, K. T., Ruan, L., & Park, S. H. (2018). Aesthetic experience of flowers and viewing behaviour: Eye-tracking and psychological analysis. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 9, 1648. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01648>
- Haviland-Jones, J., Rosario, H. H., Wilson, P., & McGuire, T. R. (2005). An environmental approach to positive emotion: Flowers. *Evolutionary Psychology*, 3(1), 104–132. <https://doi.org/10.1177/147470490500300109>
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1975). Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. *Clarendon Press*.
- Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays. *Harper & Row*.
- Hurvich, L. M., & Jameson, D. (1957). An opponent-process theory of colour vision. *Psychological Review*, 64(6p1), 384–404. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041403>
- Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. *George Allen & Unwin*.
- Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy: First book. *Springer*.
- Ishizu, T., & Zeki, S. (2011). Toward a brain-based theory of beauty. *PLoS ONE*, 6(7), e21852. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021852>
- James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. *Longmans, Green, and Co.*
- Kant, I. (2000). Critique of the Power of Judgment. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Kant, I. (2007). Critique of Judgment *Dover Publications*.
- Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. (1989). The experience of nature: A psychological perspective. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Kawabata, H., & Zeki, S. (2004). Neural correlates of beauty. *Journal of Neurophysiology*, 91(4), 1699–1705. <https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00696.2003>
- Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. *Norton*.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. *Oxford University Press*.
- Leder, H., Belke, B., Oeberst, A., & Augustin, D. (2004). A model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments. *British Journal of Psychology*, 95(4), 489–508. <https://doi.org/10.1348/0007126042369811>
- Little, A. C., Jones, B. C., & De Bruine, L. M. (2007). The role of symmetry in attraction to average faces. *Perception*, 36(9), 1367–1372. <https://doi.org/10.1068/p5791>
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. *Routledge & Kegan Paul*.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. *Routledge*.
- Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology. *W.H. Freeman*.
- Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. *Oxford University Press*.
- Phelps, E. A., LeDoux, J. E., & Neeb-Ross, P. (2014). Emotion and decision making: Multiple modulatory neural circuits. *Annual Review of Neuroscience*, 37, 263–287. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-014119>
- Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. *International Universities Press*.
- Piaget, J. (1970). Genetic epistemology. *Columbia University Press*.
- Quinn, P. C., Yahr, J., Kuhn, A., Slater, A. M., & Pascalis, O. (1997). Representation of the gender of human faces by infants: A preference for female. *Perception*, 26(4), 447–459. <https://doi.org/10.1068/p260447>
- Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing fluency and aesthetic pleasure: Is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 8(4), 364–382. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_3
- Rhodes, G. (2006). The evolutionary psychology of facial beauty. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57, 199–226. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190208>
- Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist's view of psychotherapy. *Houghton Mifflin*.
- Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils' intellectual development. *Holt, Rinehart & Winston*.
- Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. *Theoretical issues in reading comprehension*, 33–58.
- Sartre, J.P. (1956). Being and Nothingness. *Methuen*.
- Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. *American Psychologist*, 55(1), 5–14. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.5>
- Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. *Cengage Learning*.
- Thornhill, R. (2003). Darwinian aesthetics informs traditional aesthetics. *Evolutionary aesthetics*, 9–35.
- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. *MIT Press*.
- Volland, E., & Grammer, K. (2003). Evolutionary aesthetics. *Springer*.
- Von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical constructivism: A way of knowing and learning. *Falmer Press*.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. *Harvard University Press*.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. *MIT Press*.
- Wagemans, J., Feldman, J., Gepshtein, S., Kimchi, R., Pomerantz, J. R., van der Helm, P. A., & van Leeuwen, C. (2012). A century of Gestalt psychology in visual perception: II. Conceptual and theoretical foundations. *Psychological Bulletin*, 138(6), 1218–1252. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029334>
- Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. *MIT Press*.
- Zeki, S. (1999). Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain. *Oxford University Press*.